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Abstract  
 The context of information security is changing dramatically. Networking technologies have 
driven the global expansion of electronic commerce. Electronic commerce is increasingly 
engaging sophisticated advances like digital agents and web services. As a result of such 
advances, the information systems architectures that must be secured are becoming dynamic: 
shifting landscapes of changing vulnerabilities. At the same time, the threats in these landscapes 
are also becoming more sophisticated and dynamic. Information warfare is raising the stakes in 
information security by leveling intensive and highly novel threats against civilian systems. 
Information security researchers need to develop organizational approaches and methodologies 
that respond to this new context. The conflation of information warfare and short cycle 
development theories promises new information security practices. These approaches and 
methodologies would effectively lead to agile information security development. Agile 
information security development anticipates threats and rapidly deploys necessary safeguards in 
the context of shifting systems landscapes amid pervasive systems threats.  
Keywords:  Information systems security, information warfare, security analysis and design, 
agile methods, short cycle development, Internet speed. 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the growing gap between the changing landscape of 
information systems and the management of information security.  This gap promises to bring a 
continuing flood of system vulnerabilities, unless research and practice leads to new approaches 
for the rapid and continuous development of security safeguards. As an analytical argument, 
rather than empirical research, this paper contributes an important and overlooked research 
agenda for information systems scholars in the coming decade. 
The thread of this analysis and argument can be summarized as follows: 
• The argument is premised on the emergent nature of globally competitive organizations. 
• The context of information security is changing dramatically.  Two particular arenas are 
notable: 
o First, Networking technologies have driven the global expansion of electronic commerce. 
Electronic commerce is increasingly engaging sophisticated advances like digital agents 
and web services. As a result of such advances, the information systems architectures that 
must be secured are becoming dynamic: shifting landscapes of changing vulnerabilities.  
o Second, the threats in these landscapes are also becoming more sophisticated and dynamic. 
Information warfare is raising the stakes in information security by leveling intensive and 
highly novel threats against civilian systems. 
• Information security researchers need to develop organizational approaches and 
methodologies that respond to this new context.  
o The conflation of information warfare and short cycle development theories promises new 
information security practices.  
o These approaches and methodologies may effectively lead to agile information security 
development and emergent security organizations. 
• Such forms of information security development would anticipate threats and rapidly deploy 
necessary safeguards in the context of shifting systems landscapes amid pervasive systems 
threats.  
• Important and timely research questions are shaped by these arguments, and provide a 
research agenda that holds promise for greatly improving information systems security and 
thereby enabling widespread new applications of information and communications 
technologies. 
This analysis and argument is developed in the following 4 sections.  Section two analyses the 
two important ways in which the context of Information security has become a more dynamic 
setting, leading to emergent vulnerabilities and threats.  Section three describes the need for 
different forms of security organizations in order to respond to this new context.  Section four 
concludes with examples of research questions that must be addressed for Information security to 
respond to these needs. 
A key premise of this argument is the emergent nature of organizations and their information 
systems (Bergquist, 1993).  Emergent organizational forms endure continual change, a state in 
which these organizations are constantly seeking stability, while never achieving it.  The 
emergence is more complex than simple environmental adaptiveness, but rather involves 
organizational forms that interact with their context, continually remaking themselves in self-
referential ways (Varela, 1984).   Emergent organizations correspond well with dynamic 
environments, such as highly competitive markets, by maintaining continual agility.  As a 
consequence, emergent organizations are necessarily unstable and, importantly from a security 
perspective, are often unresponsive to centralized or hierarchical control.  Of course, to a degree, 
all viable organizations must be somewhat emergent.  However, highly competitive and global 
 marketplaces have driven the need for increasing the tempo of organizational emergence in many 
government and corporate organizations, while information and communications technologies 
have simultaneously enabled large, complex, and global organizations to engage a faster pace of 
emergence (Truex & Baskerville, 1998). 
This organizational emergence has led to more emergent forms of information systems 
development (ISD): Forms that respond to unpredictable organizational needs with activities that 
are also unique and unpredictable (Truex, Baskerville, & Travis, 2000).  Such forms of ISD 
deliver information systems (IS) that emerge in concert with, and thereby in support of, 
organizational emergence.  Emergent ISD forms develop systems not as a series of defined 
projects each having a clear beginning and end, but rather as continuous redevelopment of the 
entire organizational portfolio of systems. These forms manage and orchestrate systems 
development without a predefined sequence, control, rationality, or claims to universality.  Often 
associated with agile methodologies, such development has been compared to “growing” 
information systems (a gardening metaphor) as an alternative to “building” systems (an 
engineering metaphor) (Truex, Baskerville, & Klein, 1999). 
Agile methodologies (Cockburn, 2001), are known by various terms such as short-cycle-time 
development (Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 2004), and internet speed software (Baskerville, Levine, 
Pries-Heje, Ramesh, & Slaughter, 2003).  Such methods involve high-speed software 
development for intensely competitive markets, military applications, or in response to fast 
moving technology.  These methods offer an alternative that supplements slower, traditional 
software methods where organizational settings permit tradeoffs between speed and quality, 
scalability or maintainability.  Over this premise on faster, concerted emergence of organizations 
and their information systems, a security gap can easily open as shifting vulnerabilities and 
threats gradually escape stabilized security safeguards. 
2 CHANGING INFORMATION SECURITY CONTEXT 
The context of information security is changing dramatically as organizations emerge at higher 
tempos.  Vulnerabilities and threats also emerge as the organizations and their information 
systems are remade. 
2.1 Technologically-driven Vulnerabilities  
Rapid advances in networking technologies, together with the widespread access to networks, 
have driven forward fast-paced global expansion of electronic commerce.  Organizations 
worldwide are participating as stakeholders in this networked commerce. This enormous 
participation enables rapid development and deployment of exciting new technologies as 
organizations seek to gain competitive advantages over their counterparts.   
Recent examples of these sophisticated advances include digital agents and web services 
(Walczak, 2002).  Digital agents operate with a certain degree of intelligence and autonomy to 
perform services across computing applications, platforms and networks.  Web services enable 
computing software to be delivered as a service to be performed rather than an appliance to be 
sold, the software equivalent to selling the eggs rather than the chicken. 
Digital agents and web services pose extremely dynamic security vulnerabilities (van der Merwe 
& von Solms, 1998).  In both situations, organizations have to be able to place strong degrees of 
trust in software operating outside of their complete sphere of control.  Where these agents and 
web services are actually or potentially under the control of other organizations (e.g., trading 
partners or government agencies), an organization’s Information security vulnerability landscape 
could rapidly change beyond its control.  For example, digital agents might be made to perform 
 malicious acts, such as destroying data or crashing systems (Abouzakhar & Manson, 2002).  As 
another example, web services could be corrupted in destructive ways, such as a credit card 
verification service that verifies fraudulent credit cards. 
Still, such networked technological advances promise to enable IS developers to more rapidly 
construct and deploy new systems and new versions of systems.  The resulting information 
systems architectures become more dynamic.  The architectures become more fluid as these 
extend across networks and employ software components that have been developed, and are 
being controlled, by other organizations.  This shifting and increasingly dynamic architectural 
landscape is also necessarily shifting and increasingly dynamic vulnerability landscape 
(Badenhorst & Eloff, 1994). 
2.2 Subjection Threats 
It is not by chance that information and communication technologies are of growing political 
interest.  The increasing dependence on IS by so many important government, military, and 
commercial organizations means that these organizations are becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
disruption through the disruption of their systems (Garg, Curtis, & Halper, 2003).  Thus 
information systems are becoming more interesting as targets of subjection.  In terms of 
Information security, a subjection threat is one aimed at subjugating systems and their 
stakeholders by disabling or controlling these systems.  Subjection threats are a demonstration of 
power over an organization (or a government), achieving subjugation by disabling or diverting 
the systems necessary to its function.  Talented hackers have managed for decades, in small and 
large ways, to subjugate some of the information assets of mighty corporations by breaking into 
their critical information systems. 
2.2.1 The Usual Suspects: Vandalizing Hackers 
The same technologies that have empowered global economic commerce are also empowering 
hackers (and hacking organizations) to grow in their ability to subjugate information systems 
using powerful intrusion tools, distributed denial of service attacks, and malicious code like 
viruses and worms.  Thus, at a time when the vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly dynamic, 
so too are the historical sources of threat (Schultz, 2002). 
2.2.2 Information Warfare 
The historical sources of threat, however, are being joined by more powerful parties who have 
more dramatic interests in systems subjection.  These parties are military and quasi-military (e.g., 
revolutionary or terrorist) organizations engaging in warfare operations.  In addition to 
empowering dramatic advances in managing and coordinating business operations, information 
systems have also empowered similarly dramatic advances in managing and coordinating military 
operations.  Computers in battleground settings have enabled a precision in the military 
application of force that is considered to be a “Revolution in Military Affairs.”  (cf. Bhalla, 2003)  
It has naturally followed that military organizations are rapidly developing techniques to attack 
and defend the valuable and critical advantages of these military information systems.  The result 
has become known as information warfare, “Information operations conducted during time of 
crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or 
adversaries.”  Information operations are “actions taken to affect adversary information and 
information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.” (DOD 
Directive S-3600.1, 1996, cited in Denning, 1999)   This widely cited definition is important 
because of its distinction between information warfare, which is reserved for conflict, and 
information operations, which may be ongoing in peacetime as well as wartime (Jones, Kovacich, 
& Luzwick, 2002). 
 As a result of increasingly sophisticated information operations, specialists in military 
information systems are drawing considerable resources into the development of pervasive 
attacks and hardened defences for information systems.  These operations take place in a new 
“battlespace” that includes information systems (Crilley, 2001). As a result, information warfare 
leads to the development of information operations that represent deeply sophisticated and 
advanced subjection threats.  In order to remain effective in both defensive and offensive 
operations, those responsible for information operations must race to explore ways to exploit new 
information technologies using subjection threats.  In this way, military organizations are driving 
forward the tempo in subjection threat dynamics, at least in the military battlespaces. 
2.2.3 National Information Infrastructures 
The information battlespace overlaps commercial information resources in many ways.  Attention 
is mostly drawn to the infrastructures that enable the essential services that underpin a society, 
including energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and 
telecommunications.  The information systems that are essential to the operation of these essential 
services are known as the national information infrastructures (The President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997).  The motive for attacks on these infrastructures by 
military or quasi-military information operations include the disruption of national defence and 
war making capabilities, the distraction of defence resources from other parts of battlespace, and 
the undermining of public confidence in national leadership. 
Most of the sensational reports of the current vulnerabilities of these infrastructures are 
overblown.  These national information infrastructures are proving to be somewhat robust in the 
face of current information security threats (Verton, 2003).  The various “hacker wars” that have 
erupted in the shadow of national confrontations have failed to produce any notable impact 
(Vatis, 2001), and have developed into something more like juvenile food fights than serious 
warfare (Berkowitz, 2003). 
However, in at least one incident, concepts developed for information warfare have been applied 
in an attack by quasi-military information operations against national infrastructures.  In 2000, 
pro-Israeli hackers attacked web sites belonging to the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah and 
Hamas.  The pro-Palestinian retaliation was a well-designed, phased information operation.  The 
first phase took down government web sites (the Knesset, the Defense Forces, and the Foreign 
Ministry), the second phase attacked the banking and finance infrastructure (web sites belonging 
to the Bank of Israel and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange), and the third phase attacked the 
telecommunications infrastructure (NetVision, the main Internet service provider) (Vatis, 2001). 
Clearly, the high-tempo emergent threats arising from the development of information warfare 
operations are appearing on the horizon of commercial information systems.  These are subjection 
threats that are likely to be brilliantly designed for surprise, coordinated attacks.  It appears that 
the increasing vulnerabilities of information systems will lead critical information infrastructures 
into more vulnerable postures at just about the same time that the subjection threats become 
considerably more powerful and pervasive. 
Information warfare is raising the stakes in information security by positioning intensive and 
highly novel subjection threats against several sectors of commercial systems. 
3 THE SECURITY RESEARCH GAP IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Research in information and communications technologies are developing underlying security 
technologies that can be used in addressing the changing security landscape.  For example, 
advanced firewalls and virtual private networking (VPN) can be used to fragment organizational 
 information systems into security compartments, and to extend a secure network architecture 
across unsecured public networks like the Internet.  While these are useful tools, we lack research 
into techniques for applying these tools in dynamic environments, such as in high-tempo 
emergent organizations.  Information security managers will need to manage an increasingly 
complex security architecture in support of an emergent organization.  In order to provide the 
groundwork for such management, information security researchers need to develop 
organizational approaches and methodologies that respond to this new context by providing 
techniques for supporting “emergent security.” 
Like its organizational counterpart, emergent information security endures continual change, a 
state in which the security architecture and the security organization are seeking stability, while 
never achieving it.  The security organization (and its architectural product) also continually 
remakes itself in self-referential ways as it interacts with its context.   Emergent security copes 
with the dynamics of organizations, shifting information systems architectures, and shifting 
vulnerabilities and threats by maintaining continual agility.  
Driven by the emergence in its context, security organizations and security architectures are 
already somewhat emergent.  However, it would be unfortunate if security managers continue to 
operate as if security architectures, security organizations, and their context were still stable.  It 
will become increasingly difficult to respond to a high-tempo emergent security landscape with 
an unresponsive, monolithic security organization and architecture.   
Research into emergent information security management can draw from at least two existing 
streams of research.  These research streams include defensive information warfare and agile 
systems development 
3.1 Principles of Defensive Information Warfare 
Information warfare extends to both offensive and defensive information operations.  The 
primary goal of these operations is the achievement of information superiority. Information 
superiority is the condition of acquiring, synthesizing, processing and sharing vital information to 
an extent greatly exceeding that of an adversary (Hall, 2003).  Offensive information operations 
regard degrading or destroying the vital information systems assets of an adversary, and are 
generally of interest only in military operations.  Defensive information warfare, however, 
includes information operations that are aimed at protecting the organization’s information assets.  
These practices are very similar to the security practices commonly found in many well-secured 
commercial organizations.   
However, there is one substantial, conceptual difference.  Defensive information warfare 
operations, like their offensive counterpart, regard the OODA cycle as a basic measure of their 
effectiveness.  The OODA cycle, (observe, orient, decide, and act) is the basic measure of the 
responsiveness of a effective security unit. An effective unit will sense a change in its setting 
(observe), analyze the meaning and importance of this change (orient), determine an ideal 
strategy taking advantage of the change (decide) and then implement this strategy (act).  
Information superiority is achieved when the cycle times for this OODA cycle is markedly 
shorter than that of an adversary.  
3.2 Principles of Short-Cycle Development 
The importance of short cycle times is familiar in competitive ISD communities.  This class of 
ISD approaches, including agile methodologies and internet speed software, engage the principle 
of shortened cycle times with somewhat similar goals to defensive information operations: 
Competitive (superior) information.   
 Research into short cycle time development shows that a package of at least five key practices 
characterize this form of development.  These practices include a focus on completion speed, 
release-oriented parallel prototyping, adherence to a fixed architecture, negotiable quality, and an 
ideal workforce (Baskerville & Pries-Heje, 2004).  These practices respond to at least seven agile 
principles:  Accept multiple valid approaches, engage the customer, accommodate requirements 
change, build on successful experience, develop good teamwork, effective software development 
conforms to project environment constraints, prepare for unexpected consequences from 
innovation in software processes (Baskerville et al., 2003). 
3.3 Conflating Information Warfare and Short Cycle Development Theories for 
Commercial Information Security 
These short-cycle practices and agile principles enable systems developers to observe, orient, 
decide, and act in response to changes in their software system’s marketplace.  Observation is 
enabled by customer engagement, orientation and decisions are enabled by prototyping and a 
fixed architecture, and action is enabled by ideal teamwork, negotiable approaches and quality, 
and accommodation for change. The similarity between the principles and practices of short-cycle 
development and defensive information operations is intriguing.  Further research would be in 
order to determine if the short-cycle principles could be used by information security managers to 
implement concepts from defensive information warfare in order to create agile, emergent 
information security.   
Such research could demonstrate that information warfare theory and short cycle systems theory 
can be fused and extended as a basis for a new theory of emergent information security.  This 
theory would support agile security development as a basis for construct a commercial OODA 
cycle enabling organizational information security managers to gain information superiority over 
the exploitation of emergent vulnerabilities by subjection threats.  It appears promising that an 
agile, emergent security organization would be responsive to the dynamic vulnerability and threat 
landscape that future information systems are clearly going to find as their context. 
Such agile information security development practices would anticipate threats and rapidly 
deploy innovative safeguards in the context of shifting systems landscapes amid pervasive 
systems threats. Research must empirically demonstrate that an alignment between information 
warfare theory and short cycle theory would operate against constantly changing vulnerability 
and threat constellations. The result would be approaches and methodologies that would 
effectively result in agile information security development. 
3.4 Comparing Agile Security and Existing Approaches 
The development of agile security approaches would likely continue the existing evolutionary 
path of existing information systems security development and management methodologies.  
Siponen (2001) provides a thorough review of these methods in a generational analysis.  
Siponen’s first and second generations are characterised as conventional approaches and include 
checklists, risk analysis, formal models and management/evaluation standards.  First generation 
approaches arise largely from practical experience.  Siponen’s third generation is characterised as 
non-conventional approaches, and includes security semantics, the logical design approach, the 
spiral approach, abuse case modelling, and the use of object-oriented, entity relationship, and data 
flow techniques for security design purposes. Third generation approaches arise from the 
application of concepts from computer science, database, and information systems disciplines in 
the development of secure information systems. Siponen’s fourth generation, which he 
characterises as IS Community Approaches, includes sociotechnical methods and responsibility 
 modelling.  Fourth generation approaches arise from concerns about the security and welfare of 
the social community involved. 
In the analysis above, we linked the rising dynamics of security threats and the availability of 
short cycle time development approaches.  The concept of responding to fast-moving threats with 
fast-moving systems adaptation falls readily into Siponen’s third generation of non-conventional 
approaches.  In this case, we are simply applying concepts from software engineering in solving a 
security problem.  However, the underlying causal factors leading to the severity of the dynamic 
security threats is of a more social nature.  Drawing in principles of information warfare 
represents a formulated response of defensive information warfare in the face of offensive 
information warfare.  These factors more readily fall into Siponen’s IS Community Approaches 
because of the relationship to national infrastructures, terrorism, international law and morality. 
4 THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
The analysis and arguments above has shown that the high-tempo emergence of organizations 
and their information systems is both enabled and endangered by the information and 
communication technologies involved.  The security of these technologies is growing problematic 
because of the dynamics in both the constellation of information systems vulnerabilities and the 
threats being leveled against these systems.  The conflation of defensive information warfare 
theory and short cycle development theory suggests a possible avenue for future research that 
may prove fruitful in developing new emergent forms of security safeguard development. 
As a result of this argument, there is a research agenda that raises at least three key questions for 
information systems researchers.  
Research Question 1: How can agile methods be used to generate effective security requirements? 
This research question is a theoretical question leading to a theory formulation.  Although this 
work is partly completed above, additional theoretical development is needed to draw specific 
methods and techniques from the conflation of information warfare and agile systems 
development theories.  This question will address issues such as: Can the two theories be directly 
ported into commercial security development?  Does the conflation of the two theories lead to 
practical methods and techniques?  Exactly how must information warfare and short cycle 
development theories be extended or modified to shape an emergent security theoretical 
framework?  Are new security organizational forms or particular kinds of specialists required to 
fit these theories? 
Research Question 2: In what ways do these agile methods change the development of security 
requirements?   
This research question follows research question 2, and is an empirical question leading to 
descriptive results.  It addresses the security development experience under the light of the new 
theoretical framework.  This question will address issues such as: Is security requirements 
analysis easier, quicker, or less thorough than more traditional approaches.  Are multiple 
approaches to security development needed?  Are the requirements definitions more flexible, 
more attuned to changes in security vulnerabilities and threats, or dependent on a standard 
information security architecture? 
Research Question 3: How is the outcome of emergent security development different from more 
traditional forms. 
This research question follows research question 3, and it is also an applied question leading to 
descriptive results.  It addresses the ultimate success arising from the application of theory and 
practice in developing security safeguards for information systems.  This question will address 
 issues such as: Do emergent security organizations detect sudden changes in vulnerabilities or 
threats better than more traditional security organizations?  Do the short cycle security safeguards 
deploy faster than more traditional methods?  That is, is the result a form of security that is indeed 
more agile?  Is the security better because it is more responsive?  Does emergent information 
security lead to fewer security incidents? Are emergent safeguards maintainable or are they 
throwaway artefacts?  Is emergent security cheaper or more expensive than more traditional 
forms?   
These three questions illustrate the primary research agenda that proceeds from the analysis and 
arguments linking high-tempo emergent organizations, the changing landscape of information 
security vulnerabilities and threats, and the conflation of information warfare and short cycle 
development in pursuit of better information security.  Since systems security is recognized as an 
important consideration in future information systems developments, there is a clear avenue for 
important, timely, and badly needed research to investigate these questions. 
5 SUMMARY 
Global competition is driving commercial information systems to be increasingly emergent in the 
face of increasingly more sophisticated threats.  There is a growing gap between these 
information systems and the management of their security.  Vulnerabilities are rising as a result. 
New principles and practices are needed in the security management arena that close this gap.  
One promising solution is the development of new approaches for the rapid and continuous 
development of security safeguards. Such a solution might easily draw from developed bodies of 
knowledge in information warfare and short cycle time development for the purposes of building 
agile information security.  As in the field of software engineering, however, this solution does 
not supplant existing security principles or practices, but instead provides a supplement or 
extension.  Short cycle time software development is premised on a well-formed and durable 
architecture.  Similarly, agile security methods will require a well-formed and durable security 
architecture.  Traditional information security management principles will endure in order to 
continue protecting traditional systems against traditional threats. 
References 
Abouzakhar, N. S., & Manson, G. A. (2002). An intelligent approach to prevent distributed 
systems attacks. Information Management & Computer Security, 10(5), 203-210. 
Badenhorst, K. P., & Eloff, J. H. P. (1994). TOPM: A formal approach to the optimization of 
information technology risk management. Computers & Security, 13(5), 411-436. 
Baskerville, R., Levine, L., Pries-Heje, J., Ramesh, B., & Slaughter, S. (2003). Is Internet-speed 
software development different? IEEE Software, 20(6), 70-77. 
Baskerville, R., & Pries-Heje, J. (2004). Short Cycle Time Systems Development. Information 
Systems Journal, 14(2), (forthcoming). 
Bergquist, W. (1993). The Postmodern Organization: Mastering the Art of Irreversible Change. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Berkowitz, B. (2003). The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century. New 
York: The Free Press. 
Bhalla, N. (2003). Is the mouse click mighty enough to bring society to its knees? Computers & 
Security, 22(4), 322-336. 
Cockburn, A. (2001). Agile Software Development. Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
Crilley, K. (2001). Information warfare: New battle fields, Terrorists, propaganda and the 
Internet. Aslib Proceedings, 53(7), 250-264. 
Denning, D. E. (1999). Information Warfare and Security. Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley. 
 Garg, A., Curtis, J., & Halper, H. (2003). Quantifying the financial impact of IT security 
breaches. Information Management & Computer Security, 11(2/3), 74-84. 
Hall, W. M. (2003). Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press. 
Jones, A., Kovacich, G. L., & Luzwick, P. G. (2002). Everything you wanted to know about 
information warfare but were afraid to ask, part 1. Information Systems Security, 11(4), 9-
20. 
Schultz, E. E. (2002). Is hacking up or down? Computers & Security, 21(2), 103. 
Siponen, M. (2001). An analysis of the recent IS security development approaches: descriptive 
and prescriptive implications. In G. Dhillon (Ed.), Information Security Management - 
Global Challenges in the Next Millennium (pp. 101-124). Hershey: Idea Group. 
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. (1997). Critical Foundations 
Protecting America's Infrastructures (Commission Report). Washington, D.C. 
Truex, D., & Baskerville, R. (1998). Deep Structure or Emergence Theory: Contrasting 
Theoretical Foundations for Information Systems Development. Information Systems 
Journal, 8(2), 99-118. 
Truex, D., Baskerville, R., & Travis, J. (2000). Amethodical Systems Development: The Deferred 
Meaning of Systems Development Methods. Accounting, Management and Information 
Technology, 10, 53-79. 
Truex, D. P., Baskerville, R., & Klein, H. K. (1999). Growing systems in an emergent 
organization. Communications of The ACM, 42(8), 117-123. 
van der Merwe, J., & von Solms, S. H. (1998). Electronic commerce with secure intelligent trade 
agents. Computers & Security, 17(5), 435-447. 
Varela, F. (1984). The principles for self-organization. In H. Ulrich & G. J. B. Probst (Eds.), Self-
Organization and Management of Social Systems: Insights, Promises, Doubts and 
Questions (pp. 25-32). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Vatis, M. A. (2001, September 22). Cyber Attacks During The War on Terrorism: A Predictive 
Analysis [White Paper]. Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College. 
Retrieved, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/counterterrorism/cyber_a1.pdf 
Verton, D. (2003). Blaster worm linked to severity of blackout. Computerworld, 37(35), 1,4. 
Walczak, S. (2002). Information security for agent-based WWW medical information retrieval. 
Logistics Information Management, 15(5/6), 393-400. 
 
 
